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Post Re Greenpeace Supreme Court 
Reflections: Charity Law in the 21st 
Century in Aotearoa (New Zealand) 
JULIET CHEVALIER-WATTS 
Abstract 
The focus of this article is on the political purpose doctrine and 
public benefit within New Zealand charity law, in the light of 
the much awaited New Zealand Supreme Court decision in Re 
Greenpeace. This article asserts that the majority decision in 
Re Greenpeace was merely a reflection of the court’s ability to 
recognise the applicability of charity law in contemporary 
circumstances, in a way that responds to societal needs. The 
article considers the notion of public benefit as it relates to 
charity law, both prior to, and after Re Greenpeace, and 
contends that courts may find the public benefit where it is 
appropriate to do so, and in circumstances where the social 
framework favours that way of thinking. 
I  Introduction 
The long awaited New Zealand Supreme Court decision on political 
purposes and charity law, contained in Re Greenpeace of New 
Zealand Incorporated (‘Re Greenpeace’),1 may appear, prima facie, as 
a sudden volte-face in New Zealand’s approach to charity law and 
political purposes. In this case, a majority of the Supreme Court 
determined that the long-established political purpose exclusion 
should no longer apply in New Zealand. This meant that political and 
charitable purposes were not mutually exclusive in all cases.2 
 This article submits, however, that this apparent sudden about-face 
may, in reality, be an illusion. History shows us that New Zealand has 
never shied away from difficult charity law questions, while at the 
same time respecting the foundations and underlying ethos of charity 
law. This article asserts that the Supreme Court’s decision in Re 
Greenpeace is simply a reflection of our times, which encapsulates an 
approach not unfamiliar to that already taken by New Zealand’s 
courts when the circumstances dictate. In order to demonstrate this 
hypothesis, this article considers some earlier, ground breaking 
jurisprudence, and then brings the reader up-to-date with a critical 
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1  [2015] 1 NZLR 169. 
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analysis of certain New Zealand cases that have considered charity 
law and political purposes in contemporary times, including a very 
recent case in which Re Greenpeace was considered in the High Court 
of New Zealand.  
 This article focuses on public benefit, which is a fundamental 
requirement of charity law and central to discussions on political 
purposes. To that end, the article also gives some consideration to the 
flexibility and inclusive nature of some elements of the public benefit 
doctrine. The article therefore reviews the notion of public benefit as 
it relates to New Zealand charity law both prior to, and in the wake of, 
the Re Greenpeace judgment, and the final form of the New Zealand 
political purpose doctrine that materialised from this case as a means 
of expression for the critical review of public benefit. 
 It is also necessary to discuss, albeit briefly, the relevance of 
public benefit so as to contextualise this article’s assertions. From 
early times, courts have held that, for a purpose to be charitable, it 
must be of public benefit. Thus, in 1767 Lord Camden LC defined 
charity as a ‘gift to the general public use.’3 The main concern for a 
court is to ensure that the purpose is not for a private benefit, or if that 
purpose is private, that the private nature is ancillary to the overall 
charitable purpose. There is no statutory definition of charity in New 
Zealand, and for an organisation to obtain registered charitable status 
it must exist for the benefit of the public and be exclusively 
charitable.4 The notion of charitable purpose ‘owes its genesis to the 
list of purposes found in the preamble to the Statute of Charitable 
Uses Act 1601’,5 and in the purposes identified by Lord Macnaghten 
in Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel. 6 
This case ‘is generally considered to be the source of the modern 
classification of charitable trusts into four principal categories’:7 the 
relief of poverty; the advancement of education; the advancement of 
religion; and, any other purposes beneficial to the community.  
 In New Zealand, the definition of ‘charitable purposes’ is to be 
found in s 5(1) of the Charities Act 2005 (NZ), which states: 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, charitable purpose 
includes every charitable purpose, whether it relates to the relief of 
poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or any other matter 
beneficial to the community. 
                                                
3  G E Dal Pont, Charity Law in Australia and New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 
2000) 13, citing Jones v Williams (1767) Amb 651, 652. 
4  New Zealand Computer Society Inc (2011) 25 NZTC 25, 247 [10]–[12]. 
5  Re Family First New Zealand (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Collins J, 30 
June 2015) [17]; Statute of Charitable Uses Act 1601 (Imp) is also referred to as the 
“Statute of Elizabeth”.  
6  [1891] AC 531, 583. 
7  Re Family First New Zealand (Unreported, High Court of New Zealand, Collins J, 30 
June 2015) [18]. 
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 As noted, to be charitable, an organisation’s purposes must be for 
public benefit. In New Zealand, for the first three heads of charity, 
public benefit is presumed unless that presumption can be rebutted.8 
Under the fourth head of charity, public benefit ‘must be expressly 
shown and must be sufficiently within the spirit and intendment of the 
Statute of Elizabeth 1601 to be a charitable purpose.’9 In order to 
achieve its object, this article critically assesses a number of key 
cases. While not all of these cases focus on political purposes, they 
each illustrate the key methodology of the New Zealand courts in 
assessing public benefit generally. This methodology has led to key 
changes within the political purpose doctrine, which has in turn been 
the subject of many judicial and academic discussions over the years. 
II  The Legal Landscape Prior to the  
Supreme Court Decision 
The first case of note is Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
(‘Latimer’).10 This case provides a clear illustration of the value 
afforded to the adaptability of charity law by New Zealand courts, and 
is an early pioneer in the jurisprudence of Aotearoa (New Zealand) 
insofar as it simply responded to cultural and social norms of the time. 
 Latimer concerned an agreement between the Crown, the New 
Zealand Maori Council and the Federation of Maori Authorities Inc, 
whereby the Crown sold existing tree crops on Crown forestry land to 
third party commercial purchasers. These purchasers were to make an 
initial capital payment, and then an annual rental for the use of the 
land. The initial payment and the rental payment were to be placed in 
a fund administered by a trust. The interest earned on the rental 
proceedings was to be made available to Maori to assist in the 
preparation, presentation and negotiation of claims before the 
Waitangi Tribunal, which claims involved lands covered by the 
agreement. The trustees contended that the purpose of the trust was 
charitable. The question for the Court, therefore, among other issues, 
was whether the trust had public benefit.  
 In outlining the purpose of the assistance to be given to Maori 
claimants, it was important for the New Zealand Court of Appeal to 
understand the Waitangi Tribunal process. When that process was 
understood, it was clear that the assistance purpose was ‘not a mere 
matter of funding litigants in the preparation, presentation and 
                                                
8  National Anti-Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1948] AC 31, 65; 
Molloy v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1981] 1 NZLR 688, 695 (Somers J) 
(‘Molloy’). 
9  Juliet Chevalier-Watts, Law of Charity (Thomson Reuters, 2014) 47; Juliet Chevalier-
Watts, ‘Professional Bodies and Charity Law’ (2014) New Zealand Law Journal 97. 
10  [2002] 3 NZLR 195. 
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negotiation of their cases.’11 In reality, the intended outcome of the 
assistance to the claimants was that of high quality historical research. 
The results would enable the Tribunal to assess the historical record of 
what had occurred to the tribal group claimants, so that if a breach of 
the Waitangi Treaty had occurred, appropriate action could be 
undertaken. Thus, in reality, the 
research funded by the trust is a means of finally determining the truth 
about grievances long held by a significant section of New Zealand 
society (on the figures given to us, up to nearly ten per cent of the 
population) for the benefit of all members of New Zealand society. 
Without such research being properly conducted the tribunal’s findings 
might not be seen as having a sound basis and therefore might not be 
accepted either by Crown or Maori or, very importantly, by the general 
public. Settlements might not be achieved or might not be regarded as 
truly full and final. If research is not properly conducted then, whether or 
not the parties purport to reach a settlement, grievances are likely to 
continue and will be bound to lead to social ferment at a future time.12 
 The public benefit associated with the successful resolution of 
claims was considerable, and it was evident to the Court that the 
historical research being undertaken as a result of the funding was key 
to any resolutions. This in turn led the Court to conclude that there 
was ‘undoubtedly, therefore, a large public benefit in the assistance 
purpose.’13 The same could equally ‘be said in relation to the proper 
presentation of the research to the tribunal and its utilisation during 
the negotiation process’, 14  from which it was hoped that 
comprehensive and lasting settlements might be achieved.  
 In Latimer, the New Zealand Court of Appeal recognised a benefit 
that was culturally and socially appropriate for New Zealand. This 
case therefore illustrates how charity law can, where appropriate, 
adapt to meet the needs of a changing society. It also demonstrates the 
flexible and inclusive nature of the notion of benefit. However, this 
was not the end of the story. The Court still had further matters to 
consider in relation to public benefit, and its next challenge was to 
determine whether or not the claimant groups, which had their 
research funded, were, for the purposes of charity law, a section of the 
public. To answer this question, it was necessary to determine 
whether their respective purposes were directed to the general 
community, or a sufficient section of the community that would 
amount to the public.15 One significant difficulty for the claimants in 
this respect was that, prima facie, the leading English case of 
                                                
11  Ibid 207 [36]. 
12  Ibid 207 [37]. 
13  Ibid 207–208 [37]. 
14  Ibid. 
15  Verge v Somerville [1924] AC 496, 499; Dal Pont, above n 3, 15. 
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Oppenheim v Tobacco Securities Securities Trust Co Ltd 
(‘Oppenheim’)16 stood in the way of such a finding. It is worthwhile 
setting out, albeit briefly, the principles of this case so as to 
understand the background to the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Latimer.  
 In Oppenheim, the House of Lords was required to decide whether 
a trust to provide education for the children of employees, or former 
employees of British American Tobacco, was for the public benefit. 
Lord Simonds noted that a trust established by a father for the 
education of his son would not be charitable because no public 
element exists in the son’s education.17 However, in contrast, the 
establishment of a college or university would likely be charitable 
because the public element would be present.18 Of course, this 
example merely describes the notion of public benefit; it does not 
capture what is really meant by public benefit in a particular sense.19 
The ‘difficulty arises where the trust is not for the benefit of any 
institution either then existing or by the terms of the trust to be 
brought into existence, but for the benefit of a class of persons at 
large.’20 In Oppenheim, the salient question was whether a class of 
persons can be properly regarded as a section of the community to 
satisfy the test of public benefit. As Lord Simonds explained: 
These words ‘section of the community’ have no special sanctity, but they 
conveniently indicate first, that the possible (I emphasize the word 
‘possible’) beneficiaries must not be numerically negligible, and 
secondly, that the quality which distinguishes them from other members 
of the community, so that they form by themselves a section of it, must be 
a quality which does not depend on their relationship to a particular 
individual.21 
 In the result, his Lordship concluded that a trust to educate a 
member of a family, or a number of families, could not be charitable, 
even if the number of persons was considerable.22 This is because the 
‘nexus between them is their personal relationship to a single 
propositus or to several propositi’.23 Such a group could not be 
described as a community or section of the community, and could not 
therefore exist for the public benefit.  
                                                
16  [1951] AC 297. 
17  Ibid 306. 
18  Ibid. 
19  Juliet Chevalier-Watts, ‘The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand – Meeting 
Contemporary Challenges?’ (2014–15) 17 The Charity Law & Practice Review 173, 
176 (‘The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand ’.) 
20  Oppenheim [1951] AC 297, 306. 
21  Ibid. 
22  Ibid. See also Re Compton [1945] Ch 123, which provides further evidence of this 
principle. 
23  Oppenheim [1951] AC 297, 306. 
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 Lord Simonds, in referring to the children of the employees in the 
case at hand, noted that while the beneficiaries were numerous, ‘the 
difficulty arises in regard to their common and distinguishing 
quality.’24 In essence, Lord Simonds held that ‘their quality is that 
they are children of employees and, as a result, he could make no 
distinction between children of employees and employees 
themselves.’25 In Oppenheim and earlier cases, the ‘common quality 
is found in employment by particular employers’,26 and the close 
connection between the beneficiaries and the employer negated the 
public benefit. It has been said that the underlying rationale for this is 
to ‘distinguish those organisations which look outward and seek to 
provide public benefits from those which are inward looking and self-
serving.’27 
 Oppenheim established that the class of beneficiaries must not be 
numerically small, and the ‘variable which distinguishes them from 
other members of the community, must not depend upon any personal 
relationship, such as connections based on blood relationships.’28 This 
principle had potentially negative repercussions for New Zealand 
because of the issues relating to blood ties and Maori, and the issue of 
public benefit. It was evident that actually New Zealand had been 
influenced strongly by the Oppenheim decision until relatively recent 
times. The case of Arawa Maori Trust Board v Commission of Inland 
Revenue (‘Arawa’) illustrates this point. 29 At issue for the Court, inter 
alia, was whether the members of Maori Arawa tribe, and their 
descendants, would satisfy the public benefit test. Donne SM, relying 
on the authority of Oppenheim, stated that the nexus principle set out 
in Oppenheim applied ‘whether relationship be near or distant, 
whether limited to one generation or extended to two or three in 
perpetuity.’30 As a result, the trust failed the public benefit test 
because the group of persons was determined by their “whakapapa” 
— that is to say, their geneology or bloodlines.31 
 However, while the Court in Arawa might have relied on the 
authority of Oppenheim, the Court in Latimer asserted that the 
English approach was not consistent with the cultural norms of New 
                                                
24  Ibid. 
25  Chevalier-Watts, The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand, above n 19, 177. 
26  Oppenheim [1951] AC 297, 306. See also Re Hobourn Aero Component Ltd’s Air Raid 
Distresss Fund [1946] Ch 194 and Re Compton [1945] Ch 123. 
27  Chevalier-Watts, The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand, above n 19, 177, 
citing Jean Warburton et al, Tudor on Charities (Sweet & Maxwell, 9th ed, 2003) 10. 
28  Chevalier-Watts, The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand, above n 19, 177, 
citing Paul Harpur, ‘Charity Law’s Public Benefit Test: Is Legislative Reform in the 
Public Interest?’ (2003) 3(2) Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice 
Journal 425; Chevalier-Watts, Law of Charity , above n 9, ch 2. 
29  (1961) 10 MCD 391. 
30  Ibid. See also Davies v Perpetual Trust Co [1959] AC 439. 
31  Chevalier-Watts, The Operation of Public Benefit in New Zealand, above n 19, 177-8. 
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Zealand at the time. As a result, Latimer ‘created a sea change with 
respect to public benefit and blood tie relationships, and led the way 
in recognising indigenous tribal claims in Aotearoa, thus separating its 
jurisprudence from that of England.’32 The Court did this by asserting 
that Maori could be recognised as a sufficient section of the 
community for the purposes of public benefit. It was correct that for 
Maori there was of course a relationship of common descent for each 
claimant group,33 but in relation to that notion of common descent, the 
Court stated that 
the common descent of claimant groups is a relationship poles away from 
the kind of connection which the House of Lords must have been thinking 
of in the Oppenheim case when it said that no class of beneficiaries could 
constitute a section of the public for the purpose of the law of charity if 
the distinguishing quality which linked them together was a relationship 
to a particular individual either through common descent or through 
common employment. There is no indication that the House of Lords had 
in its contemplation tribal or clan groups of ancient origin.34 
In Latimer, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that it was 
more likely that the Law Lords had in mind the paradigmatic English 
approach to family relations. Lord Normand exemplified this approach in 
his observation that ‘there is no public element in the relationship of 
parent and child’ ... Such an approach might be thought insufficiently 
responsive to values emanating from outside the mainstream of the 
English common law, in particular as a response to the Maori view of the 
importance of whakapapa and whanau to identity, social organisation and 
spirituality.35  
In addition, the Court noted that Lord Normand, in Oppenheim, also 
stated that ‘the law of charity has been built up not 
logically but empirically’, 36  and that Oppenheim was subject to 
criticism in Dingle v Turner, where Lord Cross of Chelsea stated: 
In truth the question whether or not the potential beneficiaries of a trust 
can fairly be said to constitute a section of the public is a question of 
degree and cannot be by itself decisive of the question whether the trust is 
a charity. Much must depend on the purpose of the trust. It may well be 
that, on the one hand, a trust to promote some purpose, prima facie 
charitable, will constitute a charity even though the class of potential 
beneficiaries might fairly be called a private class and that, on the other 
hand, a trust to promote another purpose, also prima facie charitable, will 
                                                
32  Ibid, 178. 
33  Latimer [2002] 3 NZLR 195, 208 [38]. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid, citing Oppenheim [1951] AC 297, 310. 
36  Ibid, citing Oppenheim [1951] AC 297, 309. 
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not constitute a charity even though the class of potential beneficiaries 
might seem to some people fairly describable as a section of the public.37 
As a result, the Court concluded that, in the New Zealand context, it is 
‘impossible not to regard the Maori beneficiaries of this trust, both 
together and in their separate iwi or hapu groupings, as a section of 
the public’.38 On the second stage of inquiry, as to whether the 
purpose of the public benefit was charitable in nature, again the Court 
was staunch in its application of law appropriate to the social context 
of the times. This was because, in their Honours’ view: 
The assistance purpose of providing the Waitangi Tribunal with 
additional material which will help it produce more informed 
recommendations, leading in turn to the settlement of long-standing 
disputes between Maori and the Crown, is of that character. It is directed 
towards racial harmony in New Zealand for the general benefit of the 
community.39 
 It could be argued that Latimer was simply a jurisprudential 
forerunner to the Supreme Court’s Re Greenpeace decision, both of 
which reflect the ability of New Zealand courts to interpret and apply 
culturally and socially appropriate charity law principles. In Latimer, 
it was a context specific situation that could not have been on the 
radar of English courts when determining specific matters of public 
benefit. As a result, it would not have been appropriate at the time to 
continue to apply English authorities in what were contextually and 
culturally different circumstances. It is not apparent that the Court in 
Latimer undermined the decision in Oppenheim ; instead, their 
Honours interpreted the law in line with social constructs. Lord 
Wilberforce’s dictum, in Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation 
Society Ltd v Glasgow Corporation,40 provides support for this 
approach. In that case, his Lordship noted: 
[T]he effect of decisions given by the courts as to its scope, decisions 
which have endeavoured to keep the law as to charities moving according 
as new social needs arise or old ones become obsolete or satisfied.
41
 
 Latimer is an illustration of Lord Wilberforce’s assertion that 
charity law evolves in line with social needs, although it might be 
argued that acknowledging the public benefit of racial harmony is not 
so difficult for a court to recognise.  
                                                
37  Ibid, citing Dingle v Turner [1972] AC 601, 624. 
38  Ibid.  
39  Ibid 209 [40]. 
40  [1968] AC 138. 
41  Scottish Burial Reform and Cremation Society Ltd v Glasgow Corporation [1968] AC 
138, 154. See also McGovern v Attorney-General [1982] Ch 321, 332. 
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 In contrast is the 2013 New Zealand High Court case of Plumbers, 
Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board v Charities Registration Board 
(‘PGDB ’),42 where the challenge for Goddard J was assessing the 
public benefit in circumstances that may not, at first sight, appear to 
benefit the public directly. What becomes apparent from this case, 
nonetheless, is that while plumbing, gas fitting, and drain laying may 
be as far removed from providing public benefit as one might imagine 
— especially in comparison with the public benefit of a nation’s racial 
harmony — the reality is that New Zealand is capable of finding 
public benefit by logical and rational means. Such findings underpin 
this article’s hypothesis. Thus, the flexible and inclusive nature of the 
benefit aspect of public benefit is illustrated in a setting that, while 
rather less salubrious than the earlier case, is an entirely necessary 
function of a civilised society. Inclusivity does not distinguish 
between popular or glamorous causes so reflecting perhaps the true 
nature of public benefit. 
 The Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers Board (‘the Board’) was 
established under s 133 of the Plumbers, Gasfitters and Drainlayers 
Act 2003 (NZ) (‘the Act’), and registered as a charitable entity by the 
then Charities Commission of New Zealand in 2008.43 In 2012, the 
Board of the Department of Internal Affairs — Charities Services 
(‘DIAC’) deregistered the Board, stating that the Board’s regulation 
of its industries had private purposes that were not ancillary, which 
meant that its members benefitted significantly from the purposes. 
 Section 137 of the Act sets out the functions of the Board, and 
these include such matters as the prescription of minimum standards 
for registering as a service provider, renewing licences, and hearing 
complaints and disciplinary matters. One of the key issues for 
Goddard J was establishing whether or not s 137 benefited the public 
or the members. She concluded that its functions were 
directed to promoting the proper regulation of the regulated trades in 
order to ensure those operating within it are competent and therefore the 
health and safety of the public is therefore safeguarded, so far as 
possible.44 
 While it was evident that the members would obtain a benefit from 
the Board, the reality was that its main purpose was to ensure the 
proper imposition of safety standards for the protection of the public. 
Once enunciated in this manner, it seems clear that the Board does 
provide a public benefit, and therefore this is a reflection of charity 
law responding to the times, whereby human safety is a paramount 
                                                
42  [2014] 2 NZLR 489.  
43  The Charities Commission was disbanded and its services moved to DIAC. 
44  PGDB [2014] 2 NZLR 489, 498 [48]. 
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consideration, even in situations where it may not be such an obvious 
fit. However, what is perhaps most interesting is the use of analogy by 
Goddard J in confirming the public benefit of the Board.  
 DIAC, in deregistering the Board, distinguished the Board from 
the Medical Council of New Zealand, which was considered by the 
New Zealand Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v 
Medical Council of New Zealand (‘Medical Council’).45 In that case, 
the Court found that the Medical Council was a charitable body.46 
Some of the functions of the Board were noted earlier, and Goddard J 
observed that these functions were also ‘markedly similar to the 
functions of the Medical Council of New Zealand.’47   
 The Medical Council of New Zealand was established under the 
Medical Practitioners Act 1950 (NZ), continuing under the Medical 
Practitioners Act 1968 (NZ), with its main functions being as follows: 
(a) The maintenance of a formal system of registration of medical 
practitioners. 
(b) The maintenance of discipline within the medical profession. 
(c) The accreditation and surveillance of appropriate undergraduate and 
postgraduate education of medical practitioners. 
(d) The suspension of impaired medical practitioners and the maintenance 
of systems for identifying, monitoring and rehabilitating impaired 
medical practitioners. 
(e) The provision of statistical information to the Minister of Health.48 
 It is perhaps not surprising that medical professional bodies are 
commonly registered as charities, because their public benefit is 
certainly evident, but what is perhaps surprising is the analogy made 
between the Board and the Medical Council of New Zealand in 
Medical Council and PGDB. This analogy requires further 
consideration.  
 Goddard J compared the functions of a medical body with that of 
the Board, which, ‘without wishing to denigrate the functions of a 
very important body, would not automatically strike the public as 
having the same sort of role as medical bodies.’49 In noting that the 
functions of the Board were in fact ‘markedly similar to the functions 
of the Medical Council of New Zealand’,50 Goddard J cited McKay J 
in Medical Council, who had ‘readily’ accepted 
                                                
45  [1997] 2 NZLR 297. 
46  PGDB [2014] 2 NZLR 489, 495–6 [26]. 
47  Ibid 499 [50]. 
48  Medical Council [1997] 2 NZLR 297, 297. 
49  Chevalier-Watts, Professional Bodies and Charity Law, above n 9, 100. 
50  PGDB [2014] 2 NZLR 489, 499 [50]. 
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that a principal function of the council is to provide and maintain a 
register of qualified medical practitioners. I can also accept that the 
maintenance of such a register is beneficial to those whose names are 
included in it … [It] does not follow, however, that these benefits were 
either the purpose of the legislation or the purpose of the establishment of 
the council. The restriction of the right to practise under the recognised 
descriptions, and the provision for registration of only those who are 
properly qualified, would seem to have as their obvious and primary 
focus the protection of the public.51 
Thus, in Goddard J’s view, the same analysis could be applied in 
PGDB as in Medical Council. The functions of the Board ‘may 
increase public confidence and thereby provide a flow-on benefit to 
those working in the subject industries.’52 However, those benefits 
were ‘purely collateral and incidental consequences inherent within a 
system of registration.’53 In fact, none of the functions or activities 
carried out by the Board provided sole benefits to those working in 
those industries; rather, the public benefit was paramount. 
 It is also worthwhile mentioning the views of Thomas J in Medical 
Council, albeit that Goddard J chose not to do so: 
It is my opinion that the medical council was established by Parliament 
for the purpose of protecting and promoting the health of the community. 
Parliament was seeking to in part discharge the established responsibility 
of the state for the maintenance of the health of its citizens. No other 
purpose can reasonably be ascribed to it in enacting the legislation. But 
this responsibility cannot be met, Parliament clearly determined, unless 
high standards are maintained in the practice of medicine and surgery. A 
system for the registration and disciplining of qualified medical 
practitioners was equally clearly seen to be necessary to achieve that 
objective. Hence, the medical council was established and vested with the 
function of registering medical practitioners and disciplining those whose 
conduct falls short of an acceptable standard.54 
Clearly, the Board in PGDB was also ‘established for the purposes of 
protecting and promoting the health of the community; without its 
subject industries society would be much the poorer in terms of health 
and facilities.’55 Therefore the analogy between a medical body and a 
service associated with plumbing and drainage is entirely appropriate, 
even though these bodies are poles apart in their functions. The courts 
are therefore able to apply charity law in a manner that is appropriate 
                                                
51  Ibid 499 [51], citing Medical Council [1997] 2 NZLR 297, 309; see also Chevalier-
Watts, Professional Bodies and Charity Law, above n 9, 100. 
52  PGDB [2014] 2 NZLR 489, 499 [51]. 
53  Ibid. 
54  Medical Council [1997] 2 NZLR 297, 316; Juliet Chevalier-Watts, Professional Bodies 
and Charity Law, above n 9, 100. 
55  Chevalier-Watts, Professional Bodies and Charity Law, above n 9, 100. 
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to the circumstances, and it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
Board is 
without doubt equally as valuable in its role in society as any medical or 
legal professional body and the spirit of charity may be found equally as 
positively in its purposes as its analogous bodies.56 
However, that is not to say that every ‘body’ will be analogous. For 
example, in Institution of Professional Engineers New Zealand Inc v 
Commissioner of New Zealand (‘IPENZ’),57 the question arose as to 
whether an institution established to advance science and the 
profession of engineering, the corporate plan of which involved 
employee welfare and employment, existed for the public benefit. On 
balance, the Court held that the benefits to members outweighed any 
possible public benefit. 
 In PGDB, Goddard J distinguished IPENZ, stating that if the 
Board had been established for purposes similar to those of the 
institution — that is, ‘for the benefit of those working within the 
subject industries’ — then ‘it could be expected that s 137 [of the Act] 
would have made provision for similar services.’58 In Goddard J’s 
view, ‘IPENZ is a clear example of an institution established for the 
advantage and in the interests of those working in the subject 
industries’,59 which may be distinguished on this basis from the Board 
in PGDB, which echoed the ethos of the Medical Council of New 
Zealand. As asserted previously, public benefit in those circumstances 
‘should not be undermined by merely incidental consequences of the 
provision of private benefits that come from the registration of their 
members.’60  
 What the comparison of PGDB and IPENZ demonstrates, 
therefore, is that there are checks and balances in place, as recognised 
by the Courts, to prevent public benefit extending too far. While it 
may have appeared from Latimer and PGDB that contemporary courts 
are willing to extend the boundaries of public benefit, perhaps even 
beyond those notions first conceived with the advent of the Statute of 
Elizabeth, IPENZ suggests that these checks and balances still exist 
today. 
 These various cases demonstrate that New Zealand courts are 
willing and able to apply charity law in a manner that is appropriately 
adapted to the requirements of contemporary society. In the result, 
public benefit is able to traverse a diverse range of circumstances. The 
                                                
56  Ibid. 
57  [1992] 1 NZLR 570. 
58  PGDB [2014] 2 NZLR 489, 499–500 [52]; Chevalier-Watts, Professional Bodies and 
Charity Law, above n 9, 100. 
59  PGDB [2014] 2 NZLR 489, 500 [53]. 
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ability of the law to reflect social norms can also be seen in the 
Supreme Court case of Re Greenpeace, to which this article now 
turns. 
III  Political Purposes 
A  Reception of the Doctrine in New Zealand 
One of the central considerations for the Supreme Court in Re 
Greenpeace was the concept of political purposes and public benefit 
in relation to charity law. As a result, it is pertinent to outline the 
doctrine of political purpose that has foreshadowed the decision 
making of courts in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Canada and 
Australia for many decades. 
 As might be imagined, much of New Zealand’s law, including 
charity law, is rooted in English law, and these roots — in particular, 
the doctrine of political purposes — can be traced through New 
Zealand’s case law until very recent times. It is not clear when exactly 
the political purpose doctrine was created, although its place in charity 
law was secured by the House of Lords in Bowman v Secular Society 
(‘Bowman’).61 In that case, Lord Parker stated that, in relation to 
political purposes, ‘Equity has always refused to recognise such 
objects as charitable … [A] trust for the attainment of political objects 
has always been held invalid.’62 This is not because such objects are 
illegal, but because the ‘Court has no means of judging whether a 
proposed change in the law will or will not be for the public benefit, 
and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable 
gift.’63 
 New Zealand followed this line of authority in cases such as 
Molloy.64 In that case, the Court of Appeal relied on the authority of 
Bowman and recognised that charitability will not necessarily be 
negated where the political purposes are ancillary to the main object.65 
Re Collier (Deceased) 66 also affirmed the authority of Bowman in 
New Zealand, although Hammond J (as he was then) did so with 
some reticence, asking whether it is ‘really inappropriate for a Judge 
to recognise an issue as thoroughly worthy of public debate, even 
though the outcome of that debate might be to lead to a change in the 
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62  Bowman [1917] AC 406, 441. 
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law?’67 Hammond J was not alone in such views. In Re Greenpeace,68 
Heath J stated as follows: 
Albeit with a degree of reluctance, I feel constrained to apply the full 
extent of the Bowman line of authority on the basis that I am bound to do 
so by the Court of Appeal decision in Molloy. In modern times, there is 
much to be said for the majority judgment in Aid/Watch.69 
 In Aid/Watch v Federal Commissioner of Taxation,70 a majority of 
the Australian High Court confirmed that the Bowman line of 
authority no longer had any place in Australian charity law 
jurisprudence, and established that ‘in Australia there is no general 
doctrine which excludes from charitable purposes “political 
objects”‘.71 
 The comments of Hammond J and Heath J illustrate that New 
Zealand had ‘tentative misgivings as to the relevance of the doctrine 
overall in all circumstances’,72 and with such misgivings being 
expressed so explicitly, it was perhaps not surprising that the Supreme 
Court, in Re Greenpeace, concluded that the English political 
purposes doctrine has no place in contemporary New Zealand law.  
B The Supreme Court Decision 
One of the key issues for the Supreme Court in Re Greenpeace was 
whether s 5(3) of the Charities Act 2005 (NZ) codified when political 
purpose was permissible in New Zealand. Section 5(3) of this Act 
reads: 
To avoid doubt, if the purposes of a trust, society, or an institution include 
a non-charitable purpose (for example, advocacy) that is merely ancillary 
to a charitable purpose of the trust, society, or institution, the presence of 
that non-charitable purpose does not prevent the trustees of the trust, the 
society, or the institution from qualifying for registration as a charitable 
entity. 
 The Court of Appeal had affirmed this approach as an apparent 
endorsement of Molloy, where the Court asserted that s 5(3) of the 
Act ‘identified “advocacy” as a purpose that was non-charitable and 
inconsistent with charitable status unless merely “ancillary” (the 
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exception in Molloy ).’73 In other words, the Court of Appeal regarded 
s 5(3) as providing a prohibition on non-ancillary political purposes. 
 The Supreme Court, however, asserted that the language and 
legislative history of the section point to a different interpretation, and 
that the words ‘to avoid doubt’ are ‘directed to the risk of exclusion of 
charitable status by adoption of non-charitable purposes which are 
purely ancillary to a charitable purpose of the entity.’74 The common 
law already shows that non-charitable purposes, which may include 
political activity and advocacy, will not negate charitable status, 
providing that such purposes are ancillary to the main charitable 
purpose. As a result, the Court was of the view that because s 5, and 
the Act as a whole, assumes the common law approach to charity law, 
this points away from the Act codifying when political purposes are 
permissible. All that s 5(3) provides for is ‘latitude for non-charitable 
purposes if no more than ancillary’;75 it offers nothing further about 
the scope of purposes that the common law may recognise as being 
charitable. What this means in reality, according to the Supreme 
Court, is that s 5(3) should be applied to all ancillary purposes, and 
advocacy is given as merely an illustration. The Court further added: 
There is nothing in the structure and language of the proviso or its 
legislative history to justify the words in parenthesis being treated as 
excluding any non-ancillary purpose, including advocacy or political 
activity which would otherwise properly be regarded as charitable.76 
In other words, s 5(3) does not impose a statutory exclusion of 
political purposes. This means that advocacy may be treated as 
charitable as a matter of common law77 — a point that the Court went 
on to recognise, asserting that charitable purpose and political purpose 
are not mutually exclusive.78 This article has already argued that the 
jurisprudence of New Zealand provides a number of illustrations as to 
how charity law evolves in line with social needs or social norms of 
the time, and this statement finds support in the assertions of the 
Supreme Court in Re Greenpeace, where it was noted that ‘a strict 
exclusion risks rigidity in an area of law which should be responsive 
to the way society works.’79 Such an exclusion would risk hindering 
the responsiveness of charity law to the changing requirements of 
society, which would detract from the underlying ethos of charity as a 
whole. The Court explained this further by noting: 
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Just as the law of charities recognised the public benefit of philanthropy 
in easing the burden on parishes of alleviating poverty, keeping utilities in 
repair, and educating the poor in post-Reformation Elizabethan England, 
the circumstances of the modern outsourced and perhaps contracting state 
may throw up new need for philanthropy which is properly to be treated 
as charitable. So, for example, charity has been found in purposes which 
support the machinery or harmony of civil society, such as is illustrated 
by the decisions in England and Australia holding law reporting to be a 
charitable purpose and in New Zealand by the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in Latimer v Commissioner of Inland Revenue holding the 
assistance of Maori in the preparation, presentation and negotiating of 
claims before the Waitangi Tribunal to be a charitable purpose.80  
It could be argued that PGDB is also an illustration of the finding 
of purposes that ‘support the machinery…of civil society’, in relation 
to its vital importance in ensuring the health of society. Thus, the 
Supreme Court provided numerous reasons in support of its 
conclusion that charity law should avoid being overly restrictive, not 
least because the consequences for society of such an approach may 
be severe. 
To conclude that a purpose is to support advocacy or political 
activity actually ‘obscures proper focus on whether a purpose is 
charitable within the sense used by the law.’81 Further, the Court 
found it difficult to ‘construct any adequate or principled theory to 
support blanket exclusion’ 82  because, the Court asserted, the 
development of such a principle was comparatively recent, and ‘based 
on surprisingly little authority.’83 
The Court then turned its attention to the principle of public 
benefit and how this should be determined with regard to political 
purposes, as public benefit and political purposes have previously 
been classified as mutually exclusive. In the Court’s view, excluding 
political purposes as charitable was unnecessary and a better approach 
would be to accept that an object that entails advocacy for a change in 
the law is ‘simply one facet of whether a purpose advances the public 
benefit in a way that is within the spirit and intendment of the statute 
of Elizabeth I.’84  
Nonetheless, the Court was quick to emphasise the absolute 
relevance of public benefit when assessing such purposes. In the 
Court’s view, the advancement of such causes may not always be 
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charitable because it may not be possible to say whether or not the 
promoted views benefit the public in the way in which the law 
recognises as charitable. For instance, matters of opinion may be of 
particular issue because ‘reaching a conclusion of public benefit may 
be difficult where the activities of an organisation largely involve the 
assertion of its views.’85 Here then public benefit will not be easy to 
recognise. Indeed, it is likely that there may be a limited number of 
circumstances when advocacy of certain views will be charitable. An 
argument could, however, be made that such an approach is 
contradictory. On the one hand the majority of the Court has rebuked 
the political purpose doctrine for its lack of relevance in today’s 
society, yet on the other hand they have stated that there may be a 
number of circumstances where the public benefit will not be found in 
political purposes.  
The better view, however, is that there are simply limits to the 
utility of the political purpose doctrine and with that the reality of 
endeavouring to recognise public benefit in such a wide variety of 
circumstances. Public benefit will not always be found — that is the 
reality of charity law, and merely reflects the stringency of the law by 
which charity must be measured to ensure accountability to the public. 
This is as it should be. Indeed, just because the number of occasions 
when public benefit may be found in such purposes might be limited, 
does not justify a rule that all non-ancillary advocacy should be 
characterised as non-charitable. The Supreme Court therefore 
recognised the fundamental importance of charity law in society and 
provided a mechanism by which political purposes may be construed 
as charitable, in appropriate circumstances: 
[A]ssessment of whether advocacy or promotion of a cause or law reform 
is a charitable purpose depends on consideration of the end that is 
advocated, the means promoted to achieve that end and the manner in 
which the cause is promoted in order to assess whether the purpose can be 
said to be of public benefit within the spirit and intendment of the 1601 
Statute.86 
Further, while the Court may acknowledge the limits of public benefit 
in some circumstances, their recognition that public benefit may 
actually be found within political purposes, regardless of how often, 
reflects the flexibility of the benefit element of the doctrine, whereby 
contemporary society understands that old concepts may no longer be 
acceptable in today’s way of thinking. Thus the inclusivity of its 
inherent nature is recognised and given authority. 
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 One could still argue that such an approach undermines the 
stringent requirements imposed by charity bodies (such as 
commissions and tribunals) and the courts, which ensure that purposes 
are recognised as charitable at law; however, the Supreme Court was 
very clear that the public benefit test should be met. Explicitly 
acknowledging the requirement of public benefit recognises the 
foundations of charity law and provides certainty and clarity as to the 
application of this doctrine in similar circumstances, while at the same 
time ensuring reasonable flexibility in charity law to reflect societal 
conditions. 
 It could be argued, therefore, that Re Greenpeace is a welcome 
addition to New Zealand charity law, and a decision that is not too 
much of a surprise given the history of charity law and its adaptability 
in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, there has undoubtedly been much 
anticipation as to its application in subsequent cases, and we did not 
have to wait long for its influences to be felt. The case in question is 
Re Family First New Zealand 87 — a case that was always likely to 
prove controversial because of the nature of the organisation with 
which it was concerned. 
 The object of Family First is, inter alia, to promote and advance 
research and policy supporting marriage and family as a foundation to 
a strong and enduring society.88 Family First was a registered charity 
within New Zealand. However, in 2013, the Charities Board 
deregistered the organisation. One of the key factors in that decision 
was the political purposes doctrine. It needs to be noted at the outset 
that at the time of the Board’s decision, Re Greenpeace had not been 
heard, although leave to appeal had been granted by the Supreme 
Court. The Board was of the view that Family First had a political 
purpose that promoted a point of view where the benefit was not self-
evident. This specific point of view related to the organisation’s view 
on family, which included promoting and supporting the notion of 
marriage between a man and a woman, for the purposes, inter alia, of 
raising children, and providing moral education. Family First referred 
to this notion of family as the “natural family”.89 The Board had 
concerns as to Family First’s view that the Government must shelter 
and encourage the “natural family”; its views as to the consequences 
of the demise of the “natural family”; its prescription as to the roles of 
men and women in family life; and its advocacy against individual 
rights perspectives. Such views would clearly be controversial in 
contemporary New Zealand society.90 
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 Family First first filed its appeal against the deregistration decision 
on 27 May 2013, and the parties subsequently agreed to defer the 
appeal until after judgment was handed down in Re Greenpeace, 
which happened in August 2014. The High Court allowed the appeal, 
and Collins J directed the Charities Board to reconsider the 
application of Family First as a charity in the light of the Re 
Greenpeace judgment and the High Court judgment. This High Court 
case is of particular value to this article, not only because it applies 
very recent charity law principles, but also because it does so on a 
controversial issue — family values. 
 As might be imagined, and is apparent from the decision itself, the 
decision by the Charities Board to deregister Family First was heavily 
influenced by the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Re Greenpeace, which 
held that political purposes could be no more than ancillary to an 
entity’s overall charitable purpose (the historical approach). Collins J 
acknowledged that the Board was satisfied that Family First’s main 
purpose was to promote its point of view about families, and that this 
activity was ‘so pervasive and predominant it [could] not realistically 
be considered ancillary to any valid charitable purpose.’91 Therefore, 
the Board concluded that Family First’s actions of seeking political 
outcomes were at the forefront of its endeavours.92 
 Collins J asserted that the Board’s position that Family First’s 
political objects could not be charitable could not, now, be reconciled 
with the approach taken by the majority of the Supreme Court in Re 
Greenpeace, because the position taken by the Board was based on a 
principle that has now been found to be incorrect. As a result, it would 
be appropriate for the Board to reconsider the position of Family First 
in the light of the Supreme Court judgment, whereby political 
purposes and charitable purposes are no longer mutually exclusive.  
 In addition, Collins J noted that the Board’s analysis of Family 
First’s advocacy role as being ‘controversial’, and its conclusion that 
it was not therefore of public benefit, would also need to be 
reconsidered. This is because the Supreme Court determined that ‘it 
was not a criterion for registration as a charity that the advocacy 
undertaken or views expressed by the entity were generally acceptable 
and not “controversial.”’93  This approach is surely correct. Many 
contemporary views may be controversial and contrary to general 
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societal values, yet may at some stage become accepted as normal 
practice. Examples of this may be found in the Supreme Court 
judgment where Elias CJ (delivering the judgment for the majority) 
made reference to historical charitable purposes that at first sight 
would have been socially controversial — for instance, the promotion 
of abolition of slavery, and more recently, advocacy for such ends as 
human rights.94 
 Re Family First New Zealand again demonstrates the ability of 
charity law in New Zealand, and specifically the political purposes 
doctrine, to reflect progressive societal trends. Indeed, if one 
recognises the flexible nature of a doctrine, then it should apply in all 
appropriate circumstances, not just the non-controversial situations, in 
order to be truly inclusive of all members of a democratic society. 
This submission is given weight when one looks to Collins J’s next 
consideration, that of benefit to the public, and the caution against 
subjectivity in assessing the merits of a particular view. 
 His Honour was persuaded by counsel for Family First that its 
purposes of advocating its conception of traditional family values are 
analogous to organisations that have advocated for mental and moral 
improvement of society. Collins J recognised the value of those 
submissions but cautioned that he would not suggest that the Board 
must accept that Family First’s purposes are for the benefit of the 
public when it reconsiders the case. Rather, the Board’s approach 
should be to consider whether Family First’s activities are directed at 
the promotion of moral improvement in society.95 Such analysis must 
be done with care, however, and his Honour warned against ‘seeking 
to carefully match Family First’s purposes with organisations that 
have achieved recognition as charitable entities.’96 To do so would be 
to risk undermining the Supreme Court’s recognition that political 
purposes are not excluded from being charitable at law.97 
 The other caution sounded by Collins J was in reference to 
objective analogous analysis — that is, His Honour held that analysis 
should be objective and ‘not conflated with a subjective assessment of 
the merits of Family First’s views.’98 It is possible that members of 
the Board may disagree personally with the views of Family First, 
‘but at the same time recognise there is a legitimate analogy between 
its role and those organisations that have been recognised as 
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charities.’99 This approach would therefore be consistent with the 
obligation upon members of the Board to act with honesty, integrity 
and good faith.100 The overall result therefore was that Board is to 
reconsider its decision to deregister Family First, and must give effect 
to the Supreme Court judgment of Re Greenpeace, and Collins J’s 
judgment. 
 Re Family First New Zealand correctly applies the majority 
decision in Re Greenpeace. Although Family First may have some 
controversial purposes, this does not preclude the correct recognition 
and application of charity law principles, which the New Zealand 
courts have been willing to demonstrate for many a decade, in such a 
way as to acknowledge and support changing societal needs. This 
does not guarantee that Family First will however be registered by the 
Board as a result of either of these recent judgments. Instead, the High 
Court has acknowledged the correct application of law and principles, 
and directed the Board as to their relevance in the circumstances, 
which is an entirely appropriate procedure. 
IV  Conclusion 
This article began by asserting that the New Zealand Supreme Court 
decision of Re Greenpeace, while appearing, prima facie, to be a 
sudden volte-face in terms of New Zealand’s approach to politics and 
charity, is in fact simply a reflection of the ability of New Zealand 
courts to recognise the applicability of charity law in contemporary 
circumstances in a manner that responds appropriately to the pressures 
of society at the time. This article began its journey by, perhaps 
unusually, considering some non-political purpose cases, on the basis 
that these cases reflect the key practices of the New Zealand courts in 
assessing public benefit generally, which enabled fundamental 
changes within the political purpose doctrine in order to correspond to 
the demands of society. Such changes are perhaps not so surprising 
when one takes into consideration the historical legal landscape. The 
changes are timely, and much welcomed, because the political 
purpose doctrine has been the subject of considerable judicial and 
academic discussion over the years, which has now revealed a new 
legal landscape in New Zealand. 
 In the case of Latimer, the Court of Appeal recognised that English 
charity law is no longer appropriate in the context of Maori tribes, and 
that public benefit could be found where it would be denied in the 
English context. While this was undoubtedly a challenging case for 
the Court of Appeal, at no point was it apparent that the underlying 
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principles of public benefit were not given appropriate recognition. 
Indeed, the Court went to some lengths to ensure that the public 
benefit of assisting in research in the Waitangi Tribunal was given due 
consideration within the appropriate framework for New Zealand, and 
this case was a useful first illustration of the inclusive and flexible 
nature of the benefit within the doctrine. 
 Perhaps of equal challenge to the courts was PGDB. However, 
when considering analogous cases and the appropriateness of the law 
to current times, Goddard J was of the view that the Board’s purposes 
fulfilled the relevant charitable purposes and public benefit, even 
though, prima facie, such purposes might appear charitable. The type 
of analogy made between the Medical Council and the Board in 
relation to their public functions by Goddard J is one, perhaps, that 
will be utilised by DIAC when considering the charitability of Family 
First in relation to other charitable causes. Nonetheless, Goddard J 
was quick to assert that not every ‘body’ will be analogous, and that 
appropriate checks and balances must be kept in place to ensure the 
proper functioning of charity law. This reflects the approach taken by 
Collins J in Re Family First New Zealand, where his Honour noted 
that the Charities Board may indeed not find Family First to be 
charitable. Even so, analogical assessments must be undertaken, 
which would be informed by considering the activities of Family First 
in line with moral improvements society, which is a recognised 
charitable purpose. 
 Therefore, when the Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Re 
Greenpeace, the way was already paved for the majority to ensure that 
charity law continues to meet the needs of society in an appropriate 
manner and that public benefit is recognised within a framework that 
is appropriate to the New Zealand social climate, including, 
importantly, within that of political purposes. 
 Collins J in Re Family First New Zealand emphasised the 
fundamental importance of Re Greenpeace, as it ensures that charity 
law is able to adapt in modern times. However, the decision also 
illustrates that, even though political purposes and charitable purposes 
are no longer mutually exclusive, the key emphasis is still on public 
benefit, and on ensuring that analogous assessments are undertaken in 
an appropriate context. What this therefore illustrates is that the 
political purpose doctrine of charity law, while being firmly rooted in 
history, and of evidential importance in determining legal 
charitability, is a doctrine that is fully acknowledged by the courts but 
which is not stultified by its history. Rather, the courts may find 
public benefit where appropriate and in circumstances where the 
social framework tends to that way of thinking. 
